Crises in the A Just Russia and Right Cause parties left the “ruling party” head-to-head with the Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party. However, after the 2012 reshuffle was proposed, the parties fielding candidates against United Russia in the elections have acquired a unique opportunity to capitalize on the electorate’s protest potential.

       United Russia party conference: Highlights

       It is clear that the announcement of the upcoming 2012 Putin-Medvedev reshuffle, and the fact that Dmitry Medvedev would head the United Russia party list alone were the highlights of the United Russia party conference.

       This reshuffle may only in part solve the problems United Russia will face in the parliamentary elections, but it does solve the problem of Dmitry Medvedev: there is no chance of him ending up as a “lame duck.” Naryshkin did not even rule out that Medvedev might head the party in future. It is ironic that the current President spoke of United Russia in exclusively critical terms for the entirety of his term in office, making it clear that his sympathies lay with the liberal parties. Consequently, Medvedev has disappointed and demoralized the liberal public once and for all, and the right liberals’ participation in the 2011 elections can be considered something of a damp squib.

       Perhaps the All Russia People’s Front (ARPF) will be transformed into a conventional party structure headed by Mr. Putin. A “dual core” party system would then form – a scenario carrying with it the risk that competition between Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev may develop in earnest further down the line.

       However, Vladimir Putin has clearly ensured that Dmitry Medvedev will be hostage to the situation in the country as a whole and in United Russia in particular. In 2012 the prime minister running the country will face an extremely challenging socio-economic climate, which may even result in his dismissal. Therefore, well-placed sources are not ruling out the possibility that Medvedev will make another move – this time to a position in the judiciary, such as Chairman of the Constitutional Court.

       Putin’s nomination as a presidential candidate is fraught with grave risks, aside from the fact that, we believe, the announcement was made prematurely, there is also the strong probability that the tandem’s opponents will manage to launch a real campaign against him personally by December 2011 and March 2012.

       The confrontational mood that is inevitably generated in the respective entourages of the prime minister and president, represents an even more serious danger to the “tandem”.

       The thought that Kudrin expressed (he said he did not see himself in a new Medvedev-led government), also crossed the minds of many people in the Putin team: for example, neither Igor Sechin nor Viktor Zubkov will find it particularly easy to establish a rapport with the next prime minister. It is obvious that the so-called “status St.-Petersburgers” will loathe to relinquish control over the strategic sectors of the economy and will try to convince Mr. Putin to change his mind.

       Kudrin’s dismissal, which came hot on the heels of the party conference, was approved by Putin and was intended to stress that the prime minister does not shy away from parting with old friends. It is worth recalling that a similar scenario played out back in 2007, when Viktor Ivanov, Nikolai Patrushev and Viktor Cherkesov were dismissed.

       Kudrin’s dismissal could become the beginning of the executive vertical’s collapse as a result of an error of judgment by the “ruling tandem” (the situation could follow the same course as that involving A Just Russia), or it could rally Putin’s remaining advocates around him. By advocates, of course, we mean those who are involved in the United Russia election campaign (i.e. Viktor Zubkov, Igor Sechin, Dmitry Kozak, and Sergey Naryshkin).

       Remarkably, acting through Medvedev, Vladimir Putin succeeded in creating a serious political competitor for Medvedev, without even quarrelling with his financial confidant. The possibility that Kudrin might return as premier in 2012 or 2013 cannot be ruled out.

       Those parties that based their election campaigns on criticizing United Russia are now free to charge ahead and will no doubt reap sizeable rewards. Thus, without exhaustively deploying administrative resources United Russia will find it genuinely problematic to preserve its constitutional majority in the State Duma.

       Since no new parties are expected to emerge ahead of these upcoming elections, a successful outcome for the CPRF, LDPR, or even A Just Russia should be considered politically possible.

       Parties in the pre-election period

       So far it seems clear that the makeup of the next Duma is likely to be similar to today’s, only with those parties standing against United Russia having performed better at the polls.

       The campaign’s final phase kicks off at the start of November. If during this time United Russia feels that current problems prevent it from repeating or improving this outcome, we will inevitably see a complete violation of the rules of the game to benefit the “ruling party.”

       This means that all the familiar election mantras of the various parties having equal access to the mainstream media, not using “dirty tricks” and so on will simply be swept aside.

       There was a point when an ARPF-United Russia format could easily have helped United Russia raise its result to 65-70%, provided it dipped into administrative resources, but now even this seems unattainable, with a result of 45-50% more likely.

       Simultaneously, a serious power struggle is underway within United Russia between its different factions. The conference-approved United Russia party lists dealt Boris Gryzlov’s team a blow (for instance, his associate Yury Shuvalov does not feature anywhere on the lists). Vladislav Surkov is also said to have suffered losses: his teammates Sergey Belokonev and Maksim Mishchenko are also notable by their absence from the party lists.

       Sources maintain that rumors suggesting Viktor Zubkov had his eyes on the post of speaker in the State Duma’s sixth convocation are exaggerated. Boris Gryzlov has therefore been identified as Vyacheslav Volodin – at least, that is what sources in United Russia believe to be the case.

       The Communist Party may yet prove to be the main beneficiary of all these 2012 reshuffle-related events: the communists are able to exploit this dissonant mood, while causing the Kremlin only limited distress.

       The Communist Party list, approved by their party congress, is headed by Gennady Zyuganov (who will also run for president), alongside Admiral Vladimir Komoyedov and the Communist Party youth wing’s leader Yury Afonin.

       In addition to these familiar faces, the communists’ list comprises Viktor Cherkesov, a man who used to be close to Mr. Putin but who has since been dismissed from all his posts.

       Another interesting addition was Sergey Shishkaryov, a Kuban-based businessman, who was previously listed as being in the ranks of United Russia: he will contest the election on the Krasnodar list. There is an added piquancy to all this, in that Shishkaryov is one Russia’s richest men (in the top five hundred) and owns the transportation firm Delo. Shishkaryov heads the Transport Committee in the current convocation of the State Duma.

       It is quite probable that the Liberal Democratic Party will pair up with the Communist Party in the next Duma as tried and tested partners/competitors in the elections.

       This party’s ruling triumvirate involves, predictably, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, ex-Labor Minister Sergey Kalashnikov, and the leader’s son Igor Lebedev. There are no surprise candidates on the party list: the radical nationalist gambit failed to pay off (it is said that the President's Executive Office reacted with incredulity).

       The CPRF and LDPR are expected to increase their strength in the next State Duma and are likely to provide some competition for United Russia. Moreover, it is quite probable that the Communist Party and A Just Russia will form an alliance if the latter makes it into the Duma.

       If A Just Russia’s members manage to halt the party’s disintegration and position themselves well, as a real opposition, clearly formulating focused proposals targeting those sections of the electorate that are disgruntled with the “ruling party” and the CPRF, then there is every likelihood that they will be able to repeat, or even improve on, their 2007 performance.

       Yabloko’s pre-election party conference saw the triumphant announcement that Grigory Yavlinsky, whom, sources claim Putin “likes and respects,” was making a political comeback. If Right Cause’s main problem was that the electorate simply did not recognize the party leaders, Yabloko’s is that this party leader has simply been forgotten.

       Alongside Yavlinsky and Sergei Mitrokhin, Aleksey Yablokov, leader of the “greens” intra-party grouping is the third man in Yabloko’s top three.

       At the Motherland - Congress of Russian Communities’ party conference Dmitry Rogozin announced that the party intended to join the ARPF, and pledged his allegiance to Vladimir Putin.

       Then the technical problems began: Motherland’s party conference voted for the agreement with United Russia headed by Vladimir Putin, but Rogozin had no such arrangements regarding Medvedev. The fact that Rogozin also announced that he planned to retain his post of Russia’s Permanent Representative to NATO is also worth noting.

       The previously-announced cooperation agreement between Motherland and United Russia was relayed to Gryzlov’s office, which does not bode well in terms of the likelihood of it being signed.

       According to other sources, Rogozin will be used to squeeze A Just Russia out of the parliamentary running, and to position himself as a future Minister for Ethnic Affairs in the new government.

       Following the Right Cause party conference, its election list included: Andrey Dunayev (who calls himself a “businessman with a KGB past”), mason Andrey Bogdanov and tennis player Anna Chakvetadze. With a lineup like that, even the party members themselves do not harbor any hope of getting into the Duma.

       The Prokhorov political project is clearly not over yet: it still has to pass between the members of the “ruling tandem” and the powerful Kremlin officials.

       Essentially, what happened with Right Cause only makes sense if the Presidential Executive Office (i.e. Surkov) and Prokhorov agree on launching a project that could prove interesting: replacing Mikhail Khodorkovsky (whom certain sections of the general public view as a potential presidential candidate in 2012) with an oligarch-turned-opposition leader in the presidential elections, thus demonstrating that any kind of project on similar lines will not succeed in Russia.

       The “unofficial” opposition also won a good chance to raise the stakes and build its strategy on the opportunity to recognize the 2011-2012 elections illegitimate on more solid grounds.

       However, this milieu is under close surveillance by Russia’s security services and protest opportunities remain remote.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.