The US goal is not a direct military clash, but the gradual drawing of Beijing into a protracted proxy conflict in which Washington will have the advantage in terms of time, resources and political conditions, Andrey Sushentsov writes.

       Tensions in relations between the US and China are steadily growing. Their rivalry extends to the economic, technological, military-political and ideological spheres. The Taiwan issue remains the central node of this confrontation. The Republican administration of Donald Trump is much more determined to defend the primacy of the United States in the region than its predecessors did.

       China sees its key priority as the implementation of the “great revival of the Chinese nation” project, the core of which is reunification with Taiwan. This task is not only symbolic, but also geostrategic: control over the island allows Beijing to gain unhindered access to the Pacific and ensure freedom of manoeuvre for its Navy in conditions where China’s internal seas are geographically blocked. The urgency of this task is determined by the fact that more than two-thirds of China’s energy imports depend on the Strait of Malacca, the width of which at its narrowest point is 2.8 km.

       The United States, on the contrary, views maintaining the status quo around Taiwan as a necessary condition for maintaining its shaky global leadership. Taiwan serves as a vital instrument for demonstrating the global presence and combat capability of the US Navy, a key instrument of deterrence and power projection. The threat of losing control over the situation in the region could undermine the allies’ trust in US security guarantees and provoke a chain reaction of rejection of American pre-eminence. As support for Ukraine is being curtailed (now it is 1/15 of its 2024 level), maintaining the “pyramid of trust” in US policy among allies in the Asia-Pacific is becoming a vital task.

       Beijing seeks to weaken US influence in the maritime zones of East Asia and undermine Washington’s authority as a guarantor of its allies’ security. This has been accompanied by attempts to develop land transport corridors in Eurasia that are resistant to external influence, as well as the accelerated creation of a financial infrastructure independent of American control. These steps are aimed at reducing China’s strategic vulnerability, including the risk of economic pressure or military pressure.

       Washington is responding with attempts to block the deepening of China’s economic ties with US allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. The goal is to prevent the formation of a parallel system of economic institutions and ties in which China would become the centre. At the same time, the United States is defending its position as the core of global finance, technology, and trade, seeking to maintain the status quo and control over the architecture of the global economy.

       By systematically pressuring China, Washington has initiated the modernisation of its navy – the average age of US Navy ships is twice that of Chinese naval vessels. The United States is betting on the consolidation and expansion of its alliances in the region – its key allies are Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, where US military bases are located. Strengthening these alliances is aimed at creating a united front to counter China’s growing influence. The deployment of US medium-range missiles in the region significantly expands the strike capabilities of the United States and its Asian allies and poses a threat to China. At the same time, there are no clear signs of immediate preparation for a direct armed clash: the United States is seeking to contain China within the framework of a long-term confrontation, with high political costs for Beijing.

       The United States and its allies retain a qualitative advantage with respect to aircraft carriers, nuclear attack submarines, reconnaissance-surveillance-targeting systems and integrated air defence/missile defence, but this is being eroded by the serial commissioning of multi-purpose destroyers, large-tonnage landing ships and long-range surface-to-ship and surface-to-air missiles by the People’s Liberation Army of China, creating a high-risk zone for American surface groups off the east coast of China.

       Beijing is accelerating the deployment of fifth-generation fighters and has made significant progress in the development of drones, while expanding its network of airfields and underground shelters on the islands of the South China Sea, increasing its resilience to a pre-emptive strike. As a result, the balance is shifting from a unilateral US advantage to a more complex balance of capabilities, where success is determined not by absolute power, but by the ability to quickly mobilize armed forces, protect critical communications, and maintain freedom of manoeuvre in the face of growing mutual vulnerability.

       Washington and Beijing are continuing to modernise their strategic nuclear forces. The United States retains quantitative and qualitative superiority over China in the field of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. However, by 2030, China may already have a thousand nuclear warheads, which will bring it closer to a level sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on its opponent. China is not bound by any strategic arms reduction agreements, and the growth of its arsenal is already influencing US debates on the possible expansion of its nuclear forces. Since a new multilateral arms control agreement is unlikely to be concluded before 2026, the steps taken by the US and China could potentially lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in a standoff over Taiwan. However, Beijing assumes that time is on its side and will avoid decisive action until it achieves convincing military superiority over the US in the Eastern Pacific.

       As our research shows, the US is aware of the potentially catastrophic consequences of a direct clash. For this reason, it seeks to provoke China to take confrontational steps by undermining it in the “grey zone” and resorting to hybrid forms of pressure that do not reach the threshold of direct conflict, but consistently undermine Beijing’s strategic positions. The key element of this tactic is to create an image of Taiwan as a vulnerable target, incapable of resisting for long. Such a signal provokes the Chinese leadership to take premature, perhaps not fully calculated actions. At the same time, Washington is deliberately strengthening the island’s defences: increasing arms supplies, deploying military instructors, and deploying critical elements of anti-amphibious infrastructure. The advantage is given not to large systems, but to distributed, mobile weapons – those that provide Taiwan with the ability to conduct a protracted, exhausting defence. It is important to take into account less formal signs: a surge in US legislation related to Taiwan and China, increased visits by American politicians to the island, and increased rhetoric in favour of “reducing the significance of Taiwan” for US interests.

       In the US view, all of this creates a trap for China: any forceful solution will turn not into a quick reunification operation, but into an exhausting campaign with high costs, the risk of international isolation, and severe economic consequences. Thus, the US goal is not a direct military clash, but the gradual drawing of Beijing into a protracted proxy conflict in which Washington will have the advantage in terms of time, resources and political conditions.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.