Donald Trump's unprecedented announcement of a 50% tariff on imports from Brazil came as a bombshell to the country’s political and economic elites and generated widespread repercussions in both Brazilian and international media.
The potential adoption of this protectionist measure will have severe consequences for Brazil's manufacturing sector, particularly given that the United States represents the country's second-largest trading partner, accounting for 12% of total national exports. Ironically, these are the very elites that have historically aligned themselves with Washington and, until now, had supported the ideological agenda of the American president. Even if Trump walks back his threats, as he has previously done in other cases, the damage to Brazil-US bilateral relations seems irreversible. Their political consequences may prove even deeper, as they offer Lula's third term an opportunity to revive a shared narrative rooted in sovereignty and nationalism, while also seeking to strengthen ties with BRICS+ countries. Furthermore, these reactions may help consolidate a domestic consensus in response to American unilateralism.
Historically, two core vectors have shaped Brazil’s foreign policy toward Washington. The first is related to the constraints imposed by the United States over what it considers its “traditional sphere of influence,” namely Latin America. The second involves the political and ideological alignments between the two governments. These dynamics have had a direct impact on Brazil’s foreign policy and its strategic positioning vis-à-vis other economic and political partners. Contrary to initial expectations, it is widely acknowledged that the early phase of Lula’s third term was marked by a rapprochement with the Biden administration, as well as with some European Union countries. This approach is largely attributed to the fact that these governments neither supported nor recognised the attempted coup d'etat carried out by Lula’s opposition at the outset of his mandate.
For this reason, Itamaraty has shown considerable caution regarding a more assertive alignment with China, Russia, and other Global South countries. This cautious approach has manifested itself in several key policy decisions: Brasília demonstrated scepticism toward BRICS+ expansion, refused to join the Belt and Road Initiative, and avoided broader engagement in discussions about de-dollarisation and other sensitive topics within the group. This behaviour may reflect a perception among Brazilian economic elites and even inside of Itamaraty that preserving the country’s traditional alignment with the United States is preferable, due to concerns that deeper engagement with BRICS+ could trigger adverse reactions from Washington. More recently, this stance had even been celebrated domestically, as Brazil had not been subjected to the imposition of US tariffs on “Liberation Day.”
Trump’s recent decision to impose heavy tariffs on Brazil fundamentally altered this dynamic. While the American president had long maintained that BRICS+ posed a threat to dollar supremacy and US interests, it was during the Rio de Janeiro summit itself that he announced the potential imposition of tariffs on member countries. Even in this scenario, there were significant advances in the group's summit, and the final declaration succeeded in advancing new agendas, particularly regarding artificial intelligence governance and Big Tech regulation.
It was against this backdrop that the tariff announcement surfaced. Unlike previous cases where such measures were justified by claims of trade imbalances unfavourable to the United States, Trump’s rationale for targeting Brazil was explicitly political and ideological. In this instance, the move represented a direct intrusion into Brazil’s domestic affairs, its judicial decisions and, more critically, in the upcoming presidential elections. Foreign policy rarely takes centre stage in the Brazilian public debate. Nevertheless, given the potential economic fallout, which includes increased unemployment, inflation, and rising interest rates, these impacts are likely to be felt tangibly by the general population. The Brazilian government can strategically leverage this scenario to explain economic challenges and place the blame squarely on the unilateral actions of the US. It also provides a chance to associate Trump's administration with Lula's major political adversary, former president Jair Bolsonaro. Several segments of Brazilian society have pointed out that Bolsonaro's close ideological and political ties to Trump have severely damaged his reputation, especially in the wake of claims that he conspired with the Republican Party to impose these tariffs in an effort to “harm Brazil” and destabilise the current government. Ironically, the outcome was the exact opposite of what was intended.
This interference has, to some extent, catalysed convergence between Brazil's productive economic sectors and political elites around a coordinated response to American pressures, which will likely include, at least, the adoption of reciprocal measures. Faced with this tariff threat, the current PT (Workers’ Party) government has found a strategic opportunity to revitalise nationalist narratives that had previously been relegated to the background, rearticulating discourses about national sovereignty, self-determination, and resistance to “American imperialism.” This context simultaneously allows for the strengthening of Lula’s presidential image as a “strong leader” capable of defending national interests against external pressures.
The deterioration of US-Brazil relations will compel Brasília to pursue more assertive South-South engagement as a counterweight to Washington's antagonistic stance. The stage is thus set for a strategic pivot in Brazilian foreign policy, a shift that had already been taking shape since Trump's ascent to power. The tariff threat has merely served to crystallise the thinking of the Brazilian elite and galvanise Itamaraty around the imperative of deepening BRICS+ commercial ties, potentially charting a course that diverges from Western strategic interests.
In the current circumstances, European countries are too caught up in their own domestic troubles and scrambling to hit their 5% GDP defence spending targets for NATO. The long-awaited "Mercosur-EU Agreement," once a cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy, simply cannot meet the country's trade needs in this new reality. Moreover, Europeans seem to have lost interest in the deal altogether. On the other hand, BRICS+ countries seem to be the only viable option capable of providing solutions to Brazil's current geopolitical and economic challenges, offering not just expanded trade opportunities but also a pathway for Brazil to reengage with debates on multipolarity, de-dollarisation, and local currency trade. The Trump tariff saga is far more than just another trade spat: it marks a turning point that could fundamentally reshape how Brazil positions itself on the international stage. The fact that the majority of Brazilian economic elites and politicians are now rallying together against American heavy-handedness suggests that we may be witnessing the beginning of the end of the preferential partnership with Washington, at least for as long as the ideological imbalance between the governments persists.
Faced with growing external polarisation, Brazil finds itself confronted with an inevitable strategic choice: maintain an increasingly unsustainable position of ambiguity, or assume more assertive protagonism in constructing a multipolar order. The evident limitations of the transatlantic axis, exemplified by the paralysis of the Mercosur-EU agreement, contrast with the opportunities and dynamism offered by BRICS+. Trump's recent tariff policy has opened a window of opportunity for even closer rapprochement with Beijing and Moscow. It remains uncertain whether these countries will seize this opportunity to bring Brazil back into the projects that Brasília had previously rejected or been hesitant to engage in. What remains certain is that Trump's policy of restoring “American hegemony” and constraining the countries of the Global South through coercive measures appears to precipitate precisely the process it sought to prevent.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.