The dramatic nature and results of the elections underscored the deep societal divisions in both countries: there can be no talk of a decisive victory for Trumpists in Poland or pro-European forces in Romania. But Trump’s policies resonate more strongly here than anywhere else in Europe – a stark contrast to the west of the continent, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Anton Bespalov.

       In May – June 2025, presidential elections were held in Poland and Romania, drawing significant attention within the EU and beyond. The two contests shared notable similarities. In both cases, the candidates advancing to the second round represented competing ideological platforms: liberal-pro-European and conservative-sovereignist. Each of the Romanian contenders travelled to Poland to support their respective allies: George Simion campaigned for Karol Nawrocki, while Nicu？or Dan backed Rafa？ Trzaskowski. Nawrocki’s and Simion’s parties collaborate closely within the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament. A substantial portion of the conservative electorate hailed from rural areas, whereas liberal support was concentrated in the capitals – the most developed and pro-European cities in each country.

       The primary reason for the widespread interest in these elections is best encapsulated by the term “Trumpism.”

       Indeed, Nawrocki and Simion made no secret of their admiration for Donald Trump. Trump, in turn, openly endorsed Nawrocki, inviting him to the Oval Office in early May. Additionally, the White House repeatedly criticised the annulment of Romania’s December 2024 presidential election results and reportedly exerted “intense pressure” on Romanian officials to allow the first-round winner, C？lin Georgescu, to compete in the rerun. These efforts proved futile: Georgescu was barred from running, leaving Simion – who had placed fourth in December – as the standard-bearer of the “Trumpist” faction. After winning the first round of the repeat election, he ultimately lost to his liberal opponent in the runoff.

       Simion’s claim that he had the backing of the White House may have been wishful thinking – or a deliberate manipulation of voter expectations. As The Conservative, a publication linked to the European Conservatives and Reformists, noted, “A candidate who would have the backing of the US cannot lose a presidential election in Romania.” Following the first round, Simion asserted that he had received congratulations from the US Department of Homeland Security. He also thanked Washington for permanently removing Romania from the Visa Waiver programme – a move enacted after the December election results were voided – calling it a “strong message” to Romanian authorities. Despite Romania’s pro-American leanings, such overt displays of loyalty sparked a backlash and severely damaged his credibility.

       The elections’ contentious nature and outcomes laid bare the profound polarisation in both societies: neither the Trumpists in Poland nor the pro-Europeans in Romania achieved a clear mandate. Yet, as research by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) demonstrates, Trump’s policies resonate more strongly here than anywhere else in Europe – a stark contrast to the west of the continent.

       The humanitarian dimensions of the Trumpist ideology – such as conservative values and traditional family advocacy – align closely with the views of many Poles and Romanians. Notably, despite rapid secularisation (particularly in Poland), these nations remain Europe’s most religious, which is visible in the fact that they have the highest proportion of regular church goers – a trait that aligns them with the US and sets them apart from much of the EU. The ECFR study characterises Trumpism as a revolutionary ideology reshaping European politics by energising conservative and far-right movements. Yet Trump and his allies propose no true revolution; rather, they seek to reverse the effects of the liberal globalist revolution of recent decades – a shift rejected by many in the US and parts of Europe. In this sense, Trump is not a revolutionary but a counter-revolutionary.

       Despite overt foreign involvement in the elections in Poland and Romania, observers fixated, as usual, on hypothetical “Russian interference”. This raises a question: What could Moscow hope to gain, given the absence of pro-Russian factions in either country and the entrenched Russophobia shaping their national identities? Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance, formerly led by Nawrocki, epitomises the historical narratives Russia opposes, while Simion has proudly declared himself Romania’s most Russophobic party leader.

       None of this deterred the candidates and their supporters from trading accusations of Kremlin collaboration. The most surreal moment came on May 13, when Simion and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk clashed on X. Tusk claimed Russia was “jubilant” seeing Nawrocki and his “pro-Russian Romanian equivalent” Simion share a stage days before their elections, while Simion branded Tusk “Putin’s man in Poland”.

       Such mutual allegations of Russian ties are routine in Eastern Europe’s post-socialist states, distinguished only by their absurdity. Yet external observers, too, have hastily labelled Simion’s Alliance for the Unification of Romanians (AUR) as “pro-Russian,” despite its ideology being rooted in nationalism and irredentism – including claims that Moldova is an artificial Russian construct designed to divide the Romanian nation.

       In recent years, the “pro-Russian” label in Western discourse has grown increasingly detached from actual policy or values – unlike “pro-American.” It now often signifies that a group’s rhetoric aligns with Moscow’s on select issues, even if they diverge sharply on others. Tellingly, the term “narrative” itself now implies susceptibility to manipulation, as Western viewpoints are framed as objective truths.

       This explains Western Europe’s relief at Nicu？or Dan’s victory: he shows no signs of straying from established narratives, particularly on Ukraine. Conversely, Karol Nawrocki’s win is cause for concern. Although Poland’s presidency holds limited powers, the office carries significant political weight. Nawrocki’s nationalist platform will likely intensify existing trends: waning enthusiasm for military aid to Ukraine, hardening attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees, and efforts to restrict Ukrainian agricultural imports.

       While both societies remain deeply divided, they have exhibited striking unity with regards to external threats. Overwhelming majorities in Poland and Romania support higher defence spending. Public discourse – especially in Poland – increasingly invokes preparations for war with Russia, though just 12% of Poles currently deem such a conflict plausible. However, the spectre of Russian aggression remains a potent tool for national consolidation, one that will persist amid escalating militarisation and war anxiety.

       Returning to Trump, European – including Eastern European – willingness to boost defence spending aligns neatly with his agenda. Since the Ukraine war began, the US has enjoyed unparalleled leverage in shaping European policies. Meanwhile, the EU struggles to reconcile its ambitions for developing a defence capacity of its own, with the need to follow an increasingly ideologically distant America – hoping “Trumpism” will prove a passing phase. However, should the movement gain a foothold in Europe, it will most likely happen on the EU’s eastern frontier.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.