The situation in the Baltic Sea region, where Russia directly confronts Western countries, remains alarming, although the events taking place there now do not outwardly cause such heightened interest as, for example, the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO, writes Professor Konstantin Khudoley, Head of the Department of European Studies at the Faculty of International Relations at St. Petersburg State University.

       In recent years, when several development options arose in the international relations of the Baltic Sea region, a tendency towards the most confrontational scenario has usually prevailed. This is still observable today. Some experts have even begun to compare the current situation in the Baltic with what happened several decades ago in the Balkans. However, it is difficult to agree with this. First of all, in the Balkans, Russia and the West not only competed and rivalled, but also cooperated in a number of areas. Now there is no cooperation between Russia and the West in the Baltic Sea region - in fact, there is not even a permanent dialogue on Baltic affairs. The confrontation in the Balkans in the late 20th century and early 21st century did not affect the vital interests of any of the great powers. For them, it was an important area of foreign policy, but not a priority. In contrast, the Baltic Sea region is of vital importance to Russia. It is home to St. Petersburg, the country's second most important city, Leningrad Region, which is responsible for a a significant proportion of the country’s energy exports, and Kaliningrad Region, which, despite its remoteness, is an integral part of Russia. Finally, last but not least, unlike the Balkans at the end of the 20th century - beginning of the 21st century, where the process of disintegration of the Yugoslav state played a significant destabilizing role, opening the way for many old conflicts to come to light and many new ones to emerge, state structures in the countries of the Baltic Sea region function without significant disruptions. Of course, internal conflicts, contradictions, and frictions exist here, but their severity is not so great. If we were to make a comparison with the Cold War era (although from our point of view all such comparisons and analogies are very conditional), then we could be talking about the situation in Central Europe in the 1950s–1980s, where two military-political blocs directly confronted each other, without any buffer states or neutral zones.

       Currently, all the countries of the Baltic Sea region except Russia are members of the EU and NATO, but this does not mean that the situation within them is static. Moreover, we can speak with a high degree of certainty about some shifts. First of all, we are talking about US policy under President Donald Trump, who intends to shift the focus of American policy from Europe, the former main arena of the Cold War, to China and the Pacific region. From this angle, the US is revising a number of important elements of its policy. Relations between the US and European countries have been developing in three dimensions for several decades - NATO, US-EU relations, and bilateral US agreements with individual European countries. Trump's scepticism towards NATO is well known. Nevertheless, in June 2025, he was able to compel NATO member states to increase military spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. Some experts doubt that all countries will fulfil their obligations, but almost no one doubts that the countries of the Baltic Sea region will do so. Almost all of them are already increasing their military spending, sometimes at an accelerated pace. Trump’s criticism on this issue was only directed at Germany, but even there, after Chancellor Merz came to power, the tone changed.

       Donald Trump is not going to give up his military presence in Europe. He plans to reduce the number of American troops (this may also affect the Baltic Sea region), but for the first time since 2008, he is transferring nuclear weapons to Great Britain. "Trade wars" between the US and the EU have flared up more than once, but they have ended in agreements, not a break. Despite the contradictions, both sides are too interested in each other economically. Finally, bilateral agreements between the US and the Baltic Sea region states, covering a wide range of issues, including military ones, play an important role. Unlike NATO, which is the subject of discussions from time to time, they have not been criticized in the US and the US readiness to fulfil them is not in doubt.

       Moreover, the US has almost always had good relations with the Baltic Sea region states, especially Poland and Finland, and currently the only serious reason for disagreement is the Greenland issue, which, by the way, has had little effect on US-Danish cooperation. The Baltic Sea region countries, although in different tones, have declared their support for the US in its rivalry with China and have reduced ties with Beijing. The ideological differences between Trump and the ruling circles of the Baltic Sea region states are, of course, significant. Only the new President of Poland, Karol Nawrocki, is a more or less open supporter of the American president’s ideas, but ideological differences are unlikely to affect the practical interaction of the US with these countries. Thus, the reduction of the US presence in Europe will most likely not lead to qualitative changes on the continent, but the American policy towards allies will be more differentiated depending on the extent to which they fulfil their obligations. In view of this, the countries of the Baltic Sea region will undoubtedly be in the group of those to whom the United States will pay special attention, although some peculiarities and nuances are possible here too.

       At the same time, the large European states are systematically increasing their involvement in Baltic affairs. First of all, this means Germany, for which this region has not been a priority for a long time, France, which positions itself as ready to become a defender of the entire EU in the future, and Great Britain. The role of the latter should be especially highlighted. Great Britain traditionally has good relations with the countries of the Baltic Sea region, it is connected with them by a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements. The period of cooling relations with the EU following Brexit has clearly ended and, at present, Great Britain and the EU interact on many international issues. At the same time, London is to some extent beginning to replace Washington in the formation and implementation of Western policy in the Baltic Sea region.

       Russia's relations with other states in the Baltic Sea region are characterised by a high degree of tension. All of them have implemented the EU sanctions, and sometimes they are the ones who take the toughest positions. They have almost completely stopped cooperation in all areas, both bilaterally and multilaterally, are providing assistance to Ukraine, and, finally, are going to create a belt of minefields on the borders of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland with Russia and Belarus. All this taken together indicates that the rift in Russia's relations with other Baltic Sea region states has turned out to be much deeper than some experts initially thought. Its consequences will affect the general situation in the region for a long time to come. The idea of cooperation between the Baltic Sea countries without Russia's participation is quite widespread and will probably dominate the approaches of the elites of these states when developing policies towards Russia, at least in the coming years.

       One of the most important issues is the possibility of armed clashes in the Baltic Sea between Russia and the West. We are talking primarily about the influence of external factors on the region – the deterioration of Russian-American relations, the Ukrainian crisis, the aggravation of the situation in the Arctic, etc. Within the Baltic Sea region, the most explosive point is the issue of navigation of ships that the West considers to be part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” and are under its sanctions. Attempts to create obstacles and barriers for them have already been made and have received a decisive response from Russia, but they will most likely continue in the future. The possibility of military clashes in such cases is real, and their consequences are difficult to predict. The probability that they will escalate into a major military clash is not great, but it cannot be completely ruled out.

       Tensions will also constantly persist around the Kaliningrad Region. It is unlikely that it will be subjected to a direct attack (the military potential of Poland and Lithuania is clearly insufficient for such an operation, and the transfer of large military units from other NATO countries cannot go unnoticed in Russia), but pressure on it, reminiscent of the pressure of the USSR on West Berlin in the 1950s and 1960s, is more than likely. The EU and NATO countries undoubtedly want to turn the Baltic into their "internal sea". But until now they have managed not to go beyond certain limits. Therefore, they are unlikely to announce a complete naval blockade of Kaliningrad at the moment. In the West, despite a number of bellicose statements, they cannot help but understand that this will lead to a serious military conflict with Russia. The deterrent here is undoubtedly the echoes of memories of the "balance of terror" of the Cold War, although now this may manifest itself in a completely different form.

       Russia has been firmly established on the shores of the Baltic Sea for more than three centuries. This is of great importance, not only for the Northwest, but for the entire country. International relations in the Baltic Sea region are currently at a crossroads – anxious moods, fears of armed conflict and chaos are quite strong. However, it seems that maintaining stability, at least at the current level, and finding ways to prevent an escalation of tensions in the Baltic Sea region would be in the interests of the Russian Federation to the greatest extent. Much will, of course, depend on how Russian-American relations develop: positive changes in them could also lead to an easing of tensions in the Baltic Sea region.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.