While speaking about the migration policy of the Meloni government, I touched upon some of the critical issues surrounding the migration policy of the European Union.

       Let's start with the data on asylum applications: in 2024, the number of such applications fell by 11%; the EU countries granted protection status to 437,900 asylum seekers, 7% more than in 2023. The largest number of people who received protection status was registered in Germany, France and Spain. In 2024, the majority of beneficiaries of protection status in the EU were Syrians (32%), followed by Afghans (17%) and Venezuelans (8%). In April 2025, 48,520 asylum seekers applied for international protection, which is 37% less than in April 2024 and 16% less than in March 2025.

       As is known, the common immigration policy in Europe includes basic principles which reflect the main goal - legal immigration should contribute to the socio-economic development of EU countries, and cooperation of EU countries with non-EU countries should be aimed at combating illegal immigration and human trafficking. Migration policy in the European Union is developed and implemented at two levels: the pan-European level and the national (regional) level.

       The current Migration Pact is based on the mechanism of "mandatory solidarity", which is activated when one or more Member States are under pressure. Other EU Member States can help alleviate the situation in two ways: by resettling a certain number of asylum seekers on their territory or by paying a financial contribution to finance reception in the country under pressure. Funding could also be directed towards measures related to the management of migration flows in non-European countries. However, the concept of mandatory solidarity remains controversial due to the different views of the Member States. It should be noted that the EU sets the principles for migration policy, but it is up to its Member States to decide on migration issues.

       More generally, in April 2025, the European Commission proposed the creation of a list of safe countries of origin, initially including Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Bangladesh, Colombia, India and Kosovo, and generally considering EU candidate countries as safe, except in special circumstances. This list would allow Member States to process potentially unfounded asylum applications more quickly and efficiently, using the accelerated or border procedure.

       Similarly, the migration diplomacy carried out by the European Union as a unitary political entity faces difficulties.

       This diplomacy is based on the principles of deterrence and externalisation, namely combating illegal entry into the European Union and implementing a series of agreements with non-European countries to limit migrant flows, such as Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. In the first half of 2025, the total number of illegal border crossings into the EU decreased by 21% compared to the same period in 2024. However, while 93% of illegal border crossings are from Libya, there was a 7% increase on the Central Mediterranean route and a 17% increase in arrivals to Greece from eastern Libya. It is symptomatic that recently, in early July 2025, an official EU delegation to Libya, which was sent to strengthen cooperation in the fight against illegal immigration and strengthen relations in the field of security and repatriation, was rejected in Benghazi. In doing so, the Libyan authorities cited alleged “serious violations of diplomatic protocol and Libyan sovereignty.”

       In short, solidarity, containment and externalisation are principles whose application is highly problematic.

       Moreover, the externalisation of migration through agreements with third countries must be consistent with EU values. In addition, it is necessary to strengthen the perception by the states of the existence of a common external border, while resolving the issue of migrant integration. The European Commission identifies key areas of integration policy, but countries do not accept a single model of integration (for example, in France the assimilation model prevails, while Germany favours the functional integration and inclusion of migrants in society).

       The migration issues and the difficulties faced by the EU governing bodies in solving this complex domestic and international problem show that the EU, as a supranational entity and as an international actor, does not have a sufficiently strong identity.

       The difficulties in managing migration flows on the part of the European Union and the Member States reveal the weakness of the process of building the legitimacy of European supranational authority and weaken the legitimacy of the authority of national governments. While the identity of the entire European continent is defined by a single geographical space and common macro-cultural features, the identity of the European Union is defined only in a political sense, i.e. by the adoption by its members of a common concept of identity and a vision of the common future of the Community.

       Unlike other regional organisations, the EU has a global political calling. The policy of welcoming and integrating migrants reflects this universal calling. The EU also has its own basic philosophy: Europeanism. Europeanism has replaced nationalism as a factor in the creation of a pan-European worldview and values. Nowadays, however, Europeanism is not necessarily identified with Europeanness.

       The formation of European identity is based on the concepts of the centrality of the individual in society and Christianity as a factor in the development of civilization and socio-cultural integration. From the point of view of Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, it was necessary to build a united Europe on the basis of Christian and democratic values, i.e. considering Europe as a creation of Christianity in synthesis with Greek philosophy and Roman thought. In contrast, the European community is in fact based on a new humanism, the hallmarks of which are de-Christianisation (i.e. the absence of transcendence) and ethical relativism (the absence of a common ethical space). The emphasis on more general principles, such as cosmopolitanism and constitutional patriotism, inevitably leads to the dematerialisation of the political identity of the European Union currently being built.

       If we consider two possible models for building the political identity of the European Union (the democratic model and the cultural-political model), we can come to the conclusion that these are apolitical models. A special model of democracy in the EU cannot repeat the typical features of national democracies. This means that the idea of democracy is realized with the legitimization of the power of the elites. With this approach, depoliticisation is an integral and necessary feature of European construction. In other words, in this case, depoliticisation occurs in the name of maintaining the effectiveness and stability of pan-European policy.

       Thus, in line with their view of the “depoliticization” of European democracy, in recent years the political, economic and managerial elites have insisted on the reception and integration of migrants in the EU member states. However, the difficulties with this phenomenon itself and the changes in European immigration policy introduced under pressure from the member states show that the idea of democracy cannot be “abstract” to the extent of completely separating it from the national context and the democratic culture that have been created in the national context for a long time.

       The search for a political culture common to the members of the European Union is also carried out through depoliticisation. Current EU policies are interpreted against the background of national political cultures within the EU. Member states have developed their own national concepts of Europe and the EU, which are part of the national identity of each member state. It is for these reasons that a system of economic governance has been created that is not based on mutual trust between member states nor on solidarity, but on automatic mechanisms and legal norms that are far from forming a political identity. However, in the general political discourse and application of the law in migration issues, the apolitical principle of political correctness has often prevailed over the principle of solidarity, which has been widely used to influence public opinion in the Member States.

       In this regard, we should add that the data obtained from the Eurobarometer, published on March 25 of this year, paint a picture of the concerns of European citizens, demonstrating a clear shift in priorities compared to the past. In particular, if a few years ago immigration seemed to citizens to be one of the most pressing issues for the European Union, today, surprisingly, this topic seems to have lost its central role. In a rapidly changing geopolitical context, defence and security (according to 36% of EU citizens), as well as competitiveness, economy and industry (32%) are the areas that, according to EU citizens, the EU should focus on first and foremost in order to strengthen its position in the world. In Italy, energy independence, resources and infrastructure are also a priority (33%). A similar picture can be observed at the continental level: inflation and rising prices are the main concerns for 43% of European citizens, followed by the fight against poverty and EU security.

       From the above, it becomes clear that the problem of migration is an issue on which the future identity of the European Union depends as a self-presentation and external projection of its role as a regional and global entity, as well as a guarantor of international security.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.